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THE FOUNDING FATHERS SAID I AM NOT SUBJECT TO 
TERM LIMITS* 
Elias Arroyo, Esq.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Antonin Gregory Scalia served on the United States 
Supreme Court for almost thirty years.  Prior to his death, he was the 
longest serving Justice on the current Supreme Court.  Due to the life 
terms afforded to Article III judges by the Constitution, Justice Scalia 
was able to serve on the Court for 10,732 days.1  Justice Scalia firmly 
believed that justices on the Supreme Court should not be subject to 
term limits. 
My encounters with Justice Antonin Scalia resulted in many 
sleepless nights while I attended law school.  The Constitutional Law 
Professor2 at my school required that his students brief all assigned 
cases, including the concurrences and dissents.  Justice Scalia’s fre-
quent dissents deprived me of much sleep because they were often as 
lengthy as the majority opinions.  However, I always appreciated his 
 
* Justice Antonin Gregory Scalia died on February 13, 2016.  Our Country lost a great Amer-
ican.  We are forever thankful for his service to this Country. 
** Mr. Arroyo graduated cum laude from Touro Law School in 2015.  He was the Managing 
Editor of the Touro Law Review (2014-15) and the President of the Federalist Society’s Tou-
ro Chapter (2015).  Special thanks to Ryan Notarangelo, Esq. for his review and critique of 
this piece.  Many thanks to the Review for asking me to be a part of this issue honoring Jus-
tice Scalia. 
1 Justice Scalia also served on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit from August 17, 1982 until he took his seat on the Supreme Court on Sep-
tember 26, 1986.  Antonin Scalia Biography, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_scalia (last visited May 22, 2016). 
2 Professor Gary M. Shaw teaches Constitutional Law at Touro Law School.  He has been 
a member of the Touro Law Center for over thirty-two years.  Professor Shaw has published 
several articles on Constitutional Law.  See, e.g., Gary Shaw, Due Process in American Mili-
tary Tribunals after September 11, 2001, 29 TOURO L. REV. 29 (2012); Gary Shaw, The 
Constitution of Belarus: A Good First Step Towards the Rule of Law, 6 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 
125 (1995). 
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witty style and criticisms of the Court.3 
On October 13, 2014, at a luncheon hosted by the Federalist 
Society’s New York City Lawyers Chapter at the New York Athletic 
Club, I met the Man who was responsible for my prolonged law 
school assignments.4  The night before this event, I studied many of 
Justice Scalia’s opinions and dissents, as if he were going to cold call 
and question me on trivial details.  My family, friends, and colleagues 
typically consider me a reserved, quiet, and timid person.  However, 
at the luncheon, something possessed me to ask Justice Scalia about 
whether Supreme Court justices should be subject to term limits—a 
question known to get him worked up. 
The organizers of the event went around requesting written 
questions from the attendees.  At the time I was a third-year law stu-
 
3 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (express-
ing his disapproval of the majority’s opinion that a professional sport is a place of public ac-
commodation under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).  Scalia sarcas-
tically noted that the Supreme Court had no basis on which to determine whether certain 
rules are non-essential to the game of golf.  Id.  He expanded on his criticism of the majori-
ty’s interpretation of golf rules by stating: 
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some legal obligation 
to play classic, Platonic golf – and if one assumes the correctness of all 
the other wrong turns the  Court has made to get to this point – then we 
Justices must confront what is indeed an awesome responsibility. It has 
been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, laid upon it by Congress in pursuance of the Federal Govern-
ment's power ‘to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States,’ to decide What Is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of 
the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King James II of Scotland 
prohibiting golf because it interfered with the practice of archery, fully 
expected that sooner or later the paths of golf and government, the law 
and the links, would once again cross, and that the judges of this august 
Court would some day have to wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential 
question, for which their years of study in the law have so well prepared 
them: Is someone riding around a golf course from shot to shot really a 
golfer? The answer, we learn, is yes. The Court ultimately concludes, 
and it will henceforth be the Law of the Land, that walking is not a "fun-
damental" aspect of golf. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
The dissent concluded with Justice Scalia’s comments on the progressive nature of the ma-
jority’s ruling.  Id. at 704.  He believed that the Court’s ruling would only afford additional 
benefits to competitors with disabilities.  Id.  Accordingly, “organizations that value their 
autonomy” will now have to defend necessary regulations in their respective sport, now that 
the courts have started reviewing rules of sports for “fundamentalness.”  PGA Tour, Inc., 532 
U.S. at 704. 
4 Luncheon with Justice Scalia, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/luncheon-with-us-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia. 
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dent, and had just finished reading The Liberty Amendments5 by con-
servative radio show host Mark Levin.  So I wrote down, “do you be-
lieve in term limits for Justices of the Supreme Court,” on an index 
card, and returned it to one of the event organizers.  The organizers 
casually screened all the questions provided by the attendees.  I 
thought my question would absolutely not be selected.  It was one of 
the first questions asked! 
It was apparent that Justice Scalia opposed term limits for jus-
tices of the Supreme Court.6  In typical Justice Scalia fashion, he 
boisterously answered that he did not believe Supreme Court justices 
should be subject to term limits.  I do not recall exactly what his ex-
planation was because at the time he was answering my question, I 
was concerned about his discovering that I was the one who authored 
the question. 
After meeting Justice Scalia, I began to wonder why he be-
lieved Supreme Court justices should not be subject to term limits.  Is 
it because the Framers of the Constitution intended lifetime appoint-
ments for Article III judges?  In part, yes.  But there is more to why 
Justice Scalia was against term limits for justices of the Supreme 
Court.  His view on term limits for justices was consistent with his 
subscription to originalism.7 
There are several branches of originalism.  This piece will 
evaluate Justice Scalia’s rationale for why Supreme Court justices 
 
5 MARK R. LEVIN, THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 49-71 
(2013).  Mark Levin believes that “no person may serve as Chief Justice or Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court for more than a combined total of twelve years.”  Id. at 49. 
6 Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia: Court Shouldn’t Invent New Minorities, NY 
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 20, 2013, 11:21 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-court-
shouldn-invent-new-minorities-article-1.1431659 (“Scalia dismissed the idea of term limits 
for Supreme Court justices, asking, ‘Who is drooling on the bench?’”).  On January 7, 2016, 
Justice Stephen Breyer mentioned term limits for Supreme Court justices was a topic he and 
Justice Scalia disagreed on.   
Justice Breyer said he’d be in favor of a term limit, but only if it was a 
long enough period that those appointed wouldn’t immediately be think-
ing about their next job . . . . Such a move might be politically tough to 
pull off. . . . But many conservative commentators, including U.S. Sena-
tor and presidential candidate Ted Cruz, have supported such a notion. 
Sara Randazzo, Justice Breyer on Term Limits, Differences with Justice Scalia and More, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2016, 3:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/01/07/justice-breyer-on-
term-limits-looking-beyond-u-s-shores-and-differences-with-justice-scalia/.  
7 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Originalism” as the “[t]he theory that the U.S. Consti-
tution should be interpreted according to the intent of those who drafted it and adopted it.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (8th ed. 2004). 
3
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should not be subject to term limits through the lens of original in-
tent—a branch of originalism.  Generally, judges determine original 
intent by attempting to ascertain the meanings of provisions the way 
they were understood when they were first drafted and ratified.8 
II.  ORIGINALIST VIEWS ON TERM LIMITS 
On September 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan formally 
announced the induction of Antonin Scalia into the Supreme Court of 
the United States.9  Interestingly, in his speech President Reagan 
mentioned our Founding Fathers’ debates about whether Justices 
should have life terms.  Pursuant to Article III of the United States 
Constitution “[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”10  In other words, 
Article III judges can hold office for life so long as they do not en-
gage in behavior that constitutes grounds for impeachment.11  It is 
apparent from the language of Article III that the Founding Fathers 
intended for judges to receive life terms. 
In our three-branch government system the courts of justice 
are the defenders of a limited Constitution.  For the courts of justice 
to be the defenders of a limited Constitution against “legislative en-
croachments,” the independence of the judges is essential.12  Alexan-
 
8 David F. Forte, The Originalist Perspective, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 21-27 (David F. Forte, Matthew Spalding eds., 2014). 
9 President Ronald Reagan, The Investiture of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and As-
sociate Justice Antonin Scalia at the White House (Sept. 26, 1986), in ORIGINALISM: A 
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 95-96 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
11 See generally Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).  Walter L. Nixon Jr. was a 
former Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.  Id. at 
226.  He was found guilty of making false statements to a grand jury and eventually sen-
tenced to prison.  Id.  As a result of his misconduct, he was impeached.  The Supreme Court 
heard this case on the issue of 
whether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear 
evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report 
that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, 
Art. I, § 3, cl. 6. That Clause provides that the ‘Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments.’ 
 Id.  The Court concluded that the controversy was nonjusticiable because the Impeachment 
Clause granted the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments.  Id. at 228-38. 
12 The FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982). 
4
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der Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 78 that: 
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to 
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals 
from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of 
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunc-
tures, sometimes disseminate among the people them-
selves, and which, though they speedily give place to 
better information, and more deliberate reflection, 
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion danger-
ous innovations in the government, and serious op-
pressions of the minor party in the community. 
Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution 
will never concur with its enemies, in questioning that 
fundamental principle of republican government, 
which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish 
the established Constitution, whenever they find it in-
consistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be in-
ferred from this principle, that the representatives of 
the people, whenever a momentary inclination hap-
pens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, in-
compatible with the provisions in the existing Consti-
tution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a 
violation of those provisions; or that the courts would 
be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions 
in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly 
from the cabals of the representative body. Until the 
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, 
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding 
upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; 
and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sen-
timents, can warrant their representatives in a depar-
ture from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, 
that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude 
in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of 
the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had 
been instigated by the major voice of the community.13 
Hamilton believed that a life term breathed life into judges’ 
 
13 Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added). 
5
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“independence.”  He recognized that elected representatives would be 
under pressure to serve their constituents.  Eventually the pressure of 
a majority can overwhelm representatives to the extent that they 
submit to “inclinations” that are “incompatible” with the provisions 
of the Constitution.  Judges, as the guardians of the Constitution, 
should not be subject to pressures of pleasing a faction to secure their 
tenure.  To safeguard the Constitution from impulsive reactions to 
change or even replace it, judges should be free from external pres-
sure.  At its core, a life term provides immunity against any backlash 
from the people, because judges will not be terminated from office on 
account of an unpopular decision.  Therefore, those appointed and 
confirmed as judges must exercise “judicial restraint.”14 
Justice Scalia supported his belief that justices ought not to 
have term limits with his originalist view of Article III, Section I—
which is explained by Federalist No. 78—in which Hamilton drew a 
distinction between the roles of representatives and judges in this re-
publican government.  Hamilton acknowledged that the judges’ role 
of defending against “legislative invasions . . . instigated by the ma-
jority voice,” is crucial to the survival of this republic.15  Justice Scal-
ia took his role of defending against “legislative invasions” very seri-
ously. 
Representatives, unlike judges, do not receive lifetime ap-
pointments.  Instead the people elect them to fixed terms.16  In 1992 
Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State’s Constitu-
 
14 See supra note 9 at 97.  President Reagan was impressed with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Associate Justice Scalia’s displays of judicial restraint.  He commented: 
For [the Founding Fathers], the question involved in judicial restraint 
was not—as it is not—will we have liberal or conservative courts? They 
knew that the courts, like the Constitution itself, must not be liberal or 
conservative. The question was and is, will we have government by the 
people? And this is why the principle of judicial restraint has had an 
honored place in our tradition. Progressive, as well as conservative, 
judges have insisted on its importance—Justice Holmes, for example, 
and Justice Felix Frankfurter, who once said, ‘The highest exercise of 
judicial duty is to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private 
views to the law.’ 
Id. at 96-97. 
President Reagan indicated that the Justices demonstrated “judicial restraint” in their opin-
ions. Id. at 97.  He put a lot of weight on the principle of “judicial restraint” in nominating 
the Justices. Id.  
15 See supra notes 9-11. 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
6
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tion.17  Amendment 73 limited the terms of state elected officials; 
deemed persons who served three or more terms in the United States 
House of Representatives from Arkansas, ineligible for reelection; 
and made persons who served two or more terms in the United States 
Senate from Arkansas also ineligible for reelection.18  The majority 
held that the Constitution prohibits States from implementing addi-
tional congressional qualifications to those already enumerated in the 
Constitution.19  Justice Scalia joined the dissent that favored the im-
plementation of term limits on United States representatives and sen-
ators.20  The insinuation that Justice Scalia had succumbed to a “leg-
islative invasion by a majority voice” was undermined by his 
reasoning that States are free to exercise all powers not withheld by 
the Constitution—and because the Constitution is silent on the issue 
of prescribing eligibility requirements for Representatives and Sena-
tors—States have the power to implement eligibility requirements on 
Representatives and Senators.21 
It is clear from the position he took in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
that Justice Scalia viewed representatives as dispensable.  One might 
ask, how Justice Scalia justified imposing term limits on representa-
tives, when he was a lifetime appointee.  The answer is simple.  If the 
Founding Fathers intended for representatives to have unlimited 
terms, then Alexander Hamilton would not have drawn a distinction 
between the roles of representatives and judges in Federalist No. 78. 
An originalist will look to the Founding Fathers to determine 
the original intent of the Constitution.  This is no different with the 
issue of whether judges should have term limits.  To make the case 
that judges should not be subject to term limits, an originalist like 
Justice Scalia need only cite to the Federalist Papers and Article III 
of the Constitution. 
III. NOT ALL JUSTICES SUBSCRIBE TO ORIGINALISM 
It is understandable why Justice Scalia believed that Justices 
should not be subject to term limits.  But he may have been laboring 
under the assumption that all Justices were like him.  In other words, 
 
17 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995). 
18 Id. at 784. 
19 Id. at 837-38. 
20 Id. at 845-926 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
21 Id. at 845-50. 
7
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Justice Scalia believed that his colleagues possessed his degree of 
“judicial restraint.”  One cannot help but question the “judicial re-
straint” on both the conservative and liberal wings of the Supreme 
Court, when recent rulings from the Roberts’ Court have been split 
five to four.22  The Supreme Court is divided because recent Presi-
dents have been more inclined to make political nominations.23  
However, despite the political divide on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Scalia believed that liberal and conservative justices in his Court pos-
sessed the requisite judicial restraint to serve as justices. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia was one of the most distinguished jurists of our 
time.  His personality was discernable in his writings.  Conservatives 
loved him and liberals despised him.  He shared a close friendship 
with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, his legal adversary.  In fact, at the 
luncheon I attended, Justice Scalia discussed his friendship with Jus-
tice Ginsburg whom he held in high esteem.  He expressed confi-
dence in Justice Ginsburg’s work and dedication to the Court because 
he knew that she was just as dedicated as he was to the Court. 
Still rather terrified from asking the term limit question, I no-
ticed that despite Justice Scalia’s criticisms of his colleagues, he had 
 
22 Scott Chiusano, Landmark decisions during Roberts’ decade as Chief Justice, NY 
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015, 2:35 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/landmark-cases-john-roberts-decade-chief-
justice-article-1.2378637 (“His tenure has been a mixed bag of these sentiments, as the court 
has seesawed across party lines and overturned rulings with deep-set precedents on signifi-
cant social issues.”). 
23 See id.; Richard W. Garnett, The politicization of our Supreme Court, FOX NEWS 
OPINION (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/10/05/politicization-our-
supreme-court.html (“In recent decades, Americans have increasingly turned to the Court—
or, perhaps, the justices have taken it upon themselves—to resolve divisive and difficult 
moral and political questions.”); John Anthony Maltese, The Long History of Presidents 
Nominating Supreme Court Justices in Presidential Election Years, THE COOK POLITICAL 
REPORT (Feb. 15, 2016), http://cookpolitical.com/story/9260.  
The Federalist similarly understands the power of nomination to be an 
exclusively presidential prerogative. In fact, Alexander Hamilton an-
swered critics who would have preferred the whole power of appoint-
ment to be lodged in the President by asserting that the assignment of the 
power of nomination to the President alone assures sufficient accounta-
bility. 
John McGinnis, Advice and Consent: What the Constitution Says, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
(July 19, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/07/advice-and-consent-what-
the-constitution-says.  
8
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a great deal of respect for each Justice on the current Supreme Court.  
You can call it camaraderie among the Justices, but from hearing Jus-
tice Scalia speak, it was apparent that despite the politics associated 
with the Court, each Justice is highly devoted to his or her work on 
the Court.  Justice Scalia truly believed that he and the other Justices 
of the Supreme Court should not be subject to term limits. 
9
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